The aim of this paper is to bring together the notions of quantum game and game isomorphism. The work is intended as an attempt to introduce a new criterion for quantum game schemes. The generally accepted requirement forces a quantum scheme to generate the classical game in a particular case. Now, given a quantum game scheme and two isomorphic classical games, we additionally require the resulting quantum games to be isomorphic as well. We are concerned with the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum game scheme and the strong isomorphism between games in strategic form.
i.e., tr(ρ fin M ′ i ) = α i tr(ρ fin M i ) + β i . Virtually, strategically equivalent games Γ and Γ ′ describe the same game-theoretical problem. In particular, every equilibrium (pure or mixed) of the game Γ is an equilibrium of the game Γ ′ . The strategy equivalence can be extended to take into account different orders of players' strategies. This type of equivalence is included in the definition of strong isomorphism. Clearly, if for example, two bimatrix games differ only in the order of a player's strategies we still have the games that describe the same problem from the game theoretical viewpoint. Given a quantum scheme, it appears reasonable to assume that the resulting quantum game will not depend on the numbering of players' strategies in the classical game. As a result, if there is a strong isomorphism between games, we require that the quantum counterparts of these games are also isomorphic.
Preliminaries
In order to make our paper self-contained we give the important preliminaries from game theory and quantum game theory.
Strong isomorphism
First we recall the definition of strategic form game [14] .
Definition 2 A game in strategic form is a triple Γ = (N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ) in which
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of players.
• S i is the set of strategies of player i, for each player i ∈ N.
• u i : S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n → R is a function associating each vector of strategies s = (s i ) i∈N with the payoff u i (s) to player i, for every player i ∈ N.
The notion of strong isomorphism defines classes of games that are the same up to numbering of the players and the order of players' strategies. The following definitions are taken from [15] (see also [16] , [17] and [18] ). The first one defines a mapping that associates players and their actions in one game with players and their actions in the other game.
Definition 3 Given Γ = (N, (S
, a game mapping f from Γ to Γ ′ is a tuple f = (η, (ϕ i ) i∈N ) where η is a bijection from N to N and for any i ∈ N, ϕ i is a bijection from S i to S η(i) .
Example 1 Let us consider two bimatrix games
l r t (a 00 , b 00 ) (a 01 , b 01 ) b (a 10 , b 10 ) (a 11 , b 11 ) and
Then, N = {1, 2} and
As an example of a game mapping let
Since ϕ 1 :
In general case, mapping f from (N, (
identifies player i ∈ N with player η(i) and maps S i to S η(i) . This means that strategy profile (s 1 , . . . ,
The notion of game mapping is a basis for definition of game isomorphism. Depending on how rich structure of the game is to be preserved we can distinguish various types of game isomorphism. One that preserves the players' payoff functions is called the strong isomorphism. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 4 Given two strategic games
From the above definition it may be concluded that if there is a strong isomorphism between games Γ and Γ ′ , they may differ merely by the numbering of players and the order of their strategies.
Example 2 Let
is imposed on the payoffs in (2) . This gives
where, for instance, .
are isomorphic. In this case, the games differ by the numbering of players and the order of strategies of player 2. Indeed, in the second game of (6) player 1 and 2 choose now between columns and rows, respectively. Moreover, player 1's first (second) strategy still guarantees the payoff a 00 or a 01 (a 10 or a 11 ) whereas player 2's strategies are interchanged: the first one implies now the payoff b 01 or b 11 .
Relabeling players or their strategies does not affect a game with regard to Nash equilibria. If f is a strong isomorphism between games Γ and Γ ′ , one may expect that the Nash equilibria in Γ map to ones in Γ ′ under f . We will prove the following lemma as it is needed throughout the paper.
Lemma 1 Let f be a strong isomorphism between games
Proof The proof is based on the following observation.
and
This allows us to conclude that the inequality
holds for each i ∈ N and each strategy s i ∈ S i if and only if
for each η(i) ∈ N and each strategy s
. This finishes the proof.
Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme
Let us consider a strategic game
• D i is a set of unitary operators from SU(2). The commonly used parametrization for U ∈ SU(2) is given by
Then D i is assumed to include set {U(θ, 0, 0) :
The players, by choosing U i ∈ D i , determine the final state |Ψ according to the following formula:
(1 is the identity matrix of size 2 and σ x is the Pauli matrix X).
• M i is an observable defined by the formula
The numbers a
. The player i's payoff u i in Γ EWL is defined as the average value of measurement M i , i.e.,
3 Strong isomorphism in Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum games
Having specified the notion of strong isomorphism and the generalized Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme we will now check if the isomorphism between the classically played games makes the corresponding quantum games isomorphic. We first examine the case when the players' unitary strategies depend on two parameters. The quantum game Γ EWL with
is particularly interested. That setting was used to introduce the EWL scheme [2] and has been widely studied in recent years (see, for example, [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] ). We begin with an example of isomorphic games that describe the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Example 3
The generalized Prisoner's Dilemma game and one of its isomorphic counterparts may be given by the following bimatrices:
where T > R > P > S . Note that the games are the same up to the order of player 2' strategies. Let us now examine the EWL approach to Γ and Γ ′ defined by triples
where
We first compare the sets of Nash equilibria in Γ EWL and Γ ′ EWL to check if the games may be isomorphic. We recall from [2] that there is the unique Nash equilibrium
determines the payoff profile (R, R).
When it comes to Γ ′ EWL , we set n = 2 in (12) and replace (13) (14) as (u
, 0) be an arbitrary but fixed strategy of player 2. Then it follows from (19) that strategy U
is player 1's best reply to U This means that the player 1 would obtain strictly less than T . Hence, there is no pure Nash equilibrium in the game determined by Γ ′ EWL . As a result, we can conclude by Lemma 1 that games (17) are not strongly isomorphic. The example given above shows that the EWL approach with the two-parameter unitary strategies may output different Nash equilibria depending on the order of players' strategies in the classical game. This appears to be a strange feature since games (16) represent the same decision problem from a game-theoretical point of view.
One way to make games (17) isomorphic is to replace player i's strategy set (15) with the alternative two-parameter strategy space
every time player i's strategies are switched in the classical game. In the case of games (17) this means that quantum games
The mapφ 2 should actually distinguish cases α 2 ∈ [0, π) and α 2 ∈ [π, 2π) to be a well-defined bijection as it was done in equation (20) . To simplify the proof we stick to the form (23) throughout the paper bearing in mind that for π−α 2 [0, 2π) we can always find the equivalent angle 3π − α 2 ∈ [0, 2π). We have to show for games (22) that
for i = 1, 2, where |Ψ = J † (U 1 ⊗ U 2 )J|00 and α 2 , 0) . Hence, we obtain
Application of (25) finally yields
In similar way we can prove a more general fact. Namely, if F 2 is player 2's strategy set in one of games (17) and D 2 is in the the other one then games (17) become strongly isomorphic. This observation suggests that the EWL scheme is robust with respect to changing the order of players' strategies in the classical game if the players can use strategies from D i ∪ F i , or equivalently from the set SU(2). Before stating the general result we study a specific example. a 111 , b 111 , c 111 ) .
Example 4 Let us consider the following three-person games:
The games are (strongly) isomorphic via game mapping f = (η, ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 ) such that
We see from (27) that the isomorphism maps strategy profiles as follows:
Let us now define the EWL quantum extensions Γ EWL and Γ ′ EWL for the three-player game where we identify the players' first and second strategies with values 0 and 1, respectively. That is,
where U 3 (θ 3 , α 3 , β 3 ) ),φ 1 (U 1 (θ 1 , α 1 , β 1 
According to the EWL scheme, the payoff functions for Γ EWL and Γ ′ EWL are as follows:
for i ∈ N. In order to prove that Γ EWL and Γ ′ EWL are isomorphic we have to check if
Without loss of generality we can assume that i = 1. Let us first evaluate state |Ψ ′ ,
Note that
where S η is a permutation matrix that changes the order of qubits according to η,
Using (36), (37), the fact that [
and S †
η |000 = |000 we may write |Ψ ′ as follows:
. This means that S η is the inverse operation when acting on dual vectors. This observation together with the fact that f changes the strategy order for player 1 and 3 lead us to conclusion that operator ±(σ x ⊗ 1 ⊗ σ x )S η can be viewed as f −1 in the sense of the following equality:
Let us now consider term Ψ ′ |P f ( j 1 j 2 j 3 ) |Ψ ′ for |Ψ ′ given by (35). From (39) and (40) it follows that
Hence,
Similar reasoning applies to the case i = 2, 3. We have thus proved that games given by (29) are isomorphic.
The same conclusion can be drawn for games with arbitrary but finite number N of players. 
strongly isomorphic strategic form games with
Thenf
Since η is a permutation and U(π − θ, 2π − β, π − α) = −iσ x U(θ, α, β), we can write relation (43) as
As a result,f maps
Let us now consider a permutation matrix S η ∈ M 2 N that rearranges the order of basis states {| j i } ∈ {|0 , |1 } in the tensor product | j 1 | j 2 . . . | j N . Since S η permutes the elements in a similar way asf , it is not difficult to see that
It is also clear that σ 
⊗N may be written as
Analysis similar to that in equations (40)-(42) shows that
which is the desired conclusion.
As the following example shows, the converse is not true in general.
Example 5 Let us consider two 2 × 2 bimatrix games that differ only in the order of payoff profiles in the anti-diagonal, i.e., Γ :
The EWL quantum counterparts Γ EWL and Γ ′ EWL for these games are specified by triples (29), where in this case N = {1, 2}, (2) and the measurement operators take the form
2. An easy computation shows that
where S has the outer product representation S = |00 00| + |01 10| + |10 01| + |11 11| and F = |00 00| + |01 10| + |10 01| − |11 11|. Application of equation (51) gives
As a result, games produced by Γ EWL and Γ ′ EWL are strongly isomorphic. This fact, however, is not sufficient to guarantee the isomorphism between Γ and Γ ′ . Indeed, one can check that there is no f = (η, (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )) to satisfy u i (s) = u ′ η(i) ( f (s)) for each s ∈ {t, b} × {l, r} and i = 1, 2. Alternatively, given specific payoff profiles (a 00 , b 00 ) = (4, 4), (a 01 , b 01 ) = (1, 3), (a 10 , b 10 ) = (3, 1), (a 11 , b 11 ) = (2, 2) , we can find three Nash equilibria in the game Γ and just one in the game Γ ′ . Hence, by Lemma 1 games (49) are not isomorphic.
Conclusions
The theory of quantum games has no rigorous mathematical structure. There are no formal axioms, definitions that would give clear directions of how a quantum game ought to look like. In fact, only one condition is taken into consideration. It says that a quantum game ought to include the classical way of playing the game. As a result, this allows us to define a quantum game scheme in many different ways. The scheme we have studied in the paper is definitely ingenious. It has made a significant contribution to quantum game theory. However, it leaves the freedom of choice of the players' strategy sets. Our criterion for quantum strategic game schemes requires the quantum model to preserve strong isomorphism. This specifies the strategy sets to be SU (2) . We have shown that a proper subset of SU (2) in the EWL scheme may imply different quantum counterparts of the same game-theoretical problem. In that case, the resulting quantum game (in particular, its Nash equilibria) depends on the order of players' strategies in the input bimatrix game. Hence, given a classical game, for example the Prisoner's Dilemma, we cannot say anything about the properties of the EWL approach with the two-parameter unitary strategies until we specify an explicit bimatrix for that game. This is not the case in the EWL scheme with SU(2) where, given a classical bimatrix game or its isomorphic counterpart, we always obtain the same from the game-theoretical point of view quantum game.
